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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role that insurance has played in dealing with terrorism before and after
September 11, 2001, by focusing on the distinctive challenges associated with terrorism as a
catastrophic risk.  The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) was passed by the U.S.
Congress in November 2002, establishing a national terrorism insurance program that provides up
to $100 billion commercial coverage with a specific but temporary risk-sharing arrangement between
the federal government and insurers. TRIA’s three-year term ends December 31, 2005, so Congress
soon  has to determine whether it should be renewed, whether an alternative terrorism insurance
program should be substituted for it, or whether insurance coverage is left solely in the hands of the
private sector.  As input into this process, the paper examines several alternatives and scenarios, and
discusses their potential to create a sustainable terrorism insurance program in the Unites States.
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Introduction 
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 against the United States raise a fundamental 
question about the responsibilities of the public and private sectors in reducing the risks of terrorist 
attacks and in providing adequate financial protection to victims of catastrophes.  As defined by the 
White House (2002, p. 2), homeland security is “the concerted effort to prevent attacks, reduce 
America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do 
occur.”   
Although numerous efforts have been undertaken during the last three years to prevent new 
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, the economic impact of another mega attack has to be seriously 
considered. More specifically, who should pay for future losses so as to assure business and social 
continuity should the terrorists be successful?   This paper examines the role that insurance has 
played in dealing with terrorism before and after September 11, 2001. It then evaluates alternative 
terrorism insurance programs for the future, given that the U.S. Congress must soon decide whether 
to renew the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) that was passed in November 2002.  
 
Terrorism Insurance Before and After 9/11 
Even after the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995, insurers in the United States did not view either international or domestic 
terrorism as a risk that should be explicitly considered when pricing their commercial insurance 
policy, principally because losses from terrorism had historically been small and, to a large degree, 
uncorrelated. Thus, prior to September 11, 2001, terrorism coverage in the United States was an 
unnamed peril covered in most standard all-risk commercial and homeowners’ policies covering 
damage to property and contents.     4 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, killed over 3,000 people from over 90 countries 
and inflicted insured losses currently estimated at $32.5 billion that was shared by nearly 150 
insurers and reinsurers worldwide. These attacks were the most costly event in the history of 
insurance, inflicting insured losses 1.5 times higher that of Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the previous 
record-holder. Commercial property, business interruption, workers’ compensation, life, health, 
airline liability, and general liability insurance lines each paid out claims in the billions of dollars 
(Hartwig, 2004).
2  
Reinsurers (most of them European) were financially responsible for the bulk of these losses. 
These reinsurance payments came in the wake of outlays triggered by a series of catastrophic natural 
disasters over the past decade and portfolio losses due to stock market declines. Having their capital 
base severely hit, most reinsurers decided to reduce their terrorism coverage drastically or even to 
stop covering this risk.  
Hence, in the immediate aftermath of September 11, 2001, U.S. insurers found themselves 
with significant amounts of terrorism exposure from their existing portfolio with limited possibilities 
of obtaining reinsurance to reduce the losses from a future attack. The few that did provide coverage 
to their clients charged very high prices. For example, prior to 9/11 the Chicago’s O’Hare airport 
carried $750 million of terrorism insurance at an annual premium of $125,000; after the terrorist 
attacks, insurers only offered $150 million of coverage at an annual premium of $6.9 million (Jaffee 
and Russell, 2003).   
                                                 
2 These payments are lower than the original $40 billion estimate by the insurance industry (Hartwig, 2002). This is 
primarily because of lowered liability expectations and greater utilization of the federal Victim Compensation Fund that 
will have paid nearly $5 billion to 9/11 victims and their family (Smetters, 2004). It is worth noting that the fund requires 
the beneficiaries to relinquish their rights to going to court, thus limiting liability losses that might otherwise have ended 
up in court and possibly paid by the insurance industry.      5 
Insurers warned that another event of comparable magnitude could do irreparable damage to 
the industry.
3 Furthermore, they contended that the uncertainties surrounding large-scale terrorism 
risk were so significant that it was, in fact, an uninsurable risk.  In October 2001, the Insurance 
Services Office , on behalf of insurance companies, filed a request in every state for permission to 
exclude terrorism from all commercial insurance coverage (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002). 
By early 2002, 45 states permitted insurance companies to exclude terrorism from their policies, 
except for workers’ compensation insurance policies that cover occupational injuries without regard 
to the peril that caused the injury (U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, 2002). With that 
exception, by September 11, 2002, very few firms had other insurance coverage against a terrorist 
attack (Hale, 2002).  
This situation led to a call from some private sector groups for federal intervention. For 
example, the construction and real estate industries claimed that the lack of available terrorism 
coverage delayed or prevented several projects from going forward due to concerns by lenders or 
investors (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2002).  In response to these concerns the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (U.S. Congress, 2002), based on risk sharing between the insurance industry 
and federal government, was passed by Congress on November 26, 2002 and signed into law by 
President Bush. However, the act expires on December 31, 2005, and it is unclear what type of 
terrorism insurance program, if any, will emerge in the United States.
4  
                                                 
3 For an empirical study of the market reactions to 9/11, see Doherty et al. (2003). 
4 Three bills to extend the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) program for an additional two to three years beyond 
2005 were introduced during the summer of 2004: the House Democrats'  bill (H.R. 4772), House Republican bill (H.R. 
4634) and the bipartisan Senate bill (S. 2764). The House Financial Services Committee approved H.R. 4634 in late 
September. For a discussion of potential economic effects of TRIA’s expiration, see Hubbard and Deal (2004).     6 
The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002: A Temporary Answer  
Under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, insurers are obligated to make available an 
insurance policy against terrorism to all their clients. The coverage limits and deductibles must be 
identical to non-terrorism coverage, but TRIA does not provide any guidance as to what rates should 
be charged. The insured can decline the offer. If the U.S. Treasury Secretary certifies an event as an 
“act of terrorism” carried out by foreign persons or interests
5 and involving losses in excess of $5 
million, then losses would be shared between federal government and insurers.  
There are two layers associated with TRIA reflecting who is financially responsible for the 
losses from a terrorist event.  The insurers retain the first layer through a deductible provision, 
determined as a percentage of the direct commercial property and casualty earned premiums of each 
insurer the preceding year: 10 percent in 2004 and 15 percent in 2005. The deductible level can be 
large; for example, AIG’s 2004 deductible has been estimated to be $2.7 billion, others like 
Travelers, ACE, Chubb or Berkshire have lower 2004 deductibles: $928 million, $743 million, $600 
million and $200 million, respectively (Morgan Stanley, 2004). The federal government and insurers 
are jointly responsible for the second layer of insurance industry losses up to $100 billion.  
Specifically, the government pays 90 percent of each insurer’s primary property-casualty losses 
during a given year above the applicable insurer deductible and the insurer covers the remaining 10 
percent. Should the insurance industry’s losses exceed $100 billion during a given year, then the 
U.S. Treasury determines how the losses will be divided between insurers and the federal 
government.  
                                                 
5 A domestic terrorist event like the Oklahoma City bombings of 1995, had been the most damaging terrorist attack on 
domestic soil before September 11, 2001 is not covered under TRIA. There were 168 people killed and losses were 
inflicted mostly to federal property and employees. TRIA does not cover life insurance either. The risks related to a 
terrorist attack using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass-destruction are covered under TRIA 
only if the primary insurer has included these risks in its standard commercial policy.     7 
If the insurance industry suffers terrorism losses that require the government to cover part of 
the claims payments, then these outlays are partially recouped after the event by the U.S. Treasury 
through a mandatory policy surcharge levied against insurers. Insurers, in turn, can impose a 
surcharge on all property and casualty insurance policies, whether or not the insured has purchased 
terrorism coverage. Should the final payments by the insurance industry in any given year exceed a 
certain level ($15 billion for 2005), the federal government would pay for the losses above this 
amount without the possibility of recouping such payments.  
It is worth noting that the federal government does not receive any premium for providing 
this coverage. Reinsurers cannot compete with this implicit zero cost federal terrorism reinsurance 
program and their role  has been limited to covering the deductible and the 10 percent share of 
insurer’s potential liability (15 percent in 2005).  
TRIA  requires  private  firms  to  offer  terrorism  insurance  but  also  seeks  to  ease  insurers 
concerns about suffering large losses from future terrorist events. The intent of the Act was that 
insurers would offer terrorism coverage at premiums that would be attractive to firms at risk who 
would then decide to purchase it. Although there has been an increase of demand for terrorism 
insurance in recent months, there is no guarantee that firms will continue to purchase coverage in the 
future. The latest information suggests a majority of firms have not purchased terrorism insurance 
early  in  2004.
6    Should  another  large-scale  terrorist  attack  occur  soon,  many  firms  would  be 
unprotected and insurers are likely to rethink their role yet again (MacDonald, 2004). 
 
                                                 
6 Data compiled by Marsh Inc. (2004) from more than 800 businesses and government entities that renewed property 
insurance  policies  in  the  second  quarter  of  2004  revealed  that  46  percent  of  them  had  bought  terrorism  insurance 
compared to 44 percent in the first quarter of 2004 and 32 percent in the fourth quarter of 2003. The following two 
factors appear to explain this increase in demand: Recent alerts released by the federal government on possible attacks in 
the  United  States  have  increased  firms’  concern  with  terrorism.  Since  the  overall  pricing  for  commercial  property 
insurance has continued to decrease, firms have freed up funds to purchase terrorism insurance coverage.      8 
Distinctive Challenges of Terrorism Insurance 
 
In  the  field  of  risk  management  and  insurance,  terrorism  presents  a  set  of  very  specific 
challenges. First, there is the potential for extremely large losses due to changes in the nature of 
terrorism over the past decade. Today there are an increasing number of religious-based terrorist 
groups, many of whom advocate mass casualties (Hoffman, 1998; Stern, 2003; Sandler and Enders, 
2004).
 7  
Second,  insurers  have  a  difficult  time  pricing  terrorism  insurance  given  the  uncertainty 
associated with the risk. Although terrorism risk models have been developed in the past two years, 
they are primarily designed to specify insurer’s potential exposure to losses from a wide range of 
scenarios characterizing the attack (Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan and Porter, in press). The models are 
not well-suited in estimating the likelihood of any of these scenarios occurring. In contrast to other 
catastrophic risks such as natural hazards, where large historical databases and scientific studies on 
the risks are in the public domain, data on terrorist groups’ activities and current threats are normally 
kept secret by federal agencies for national security reasons. For example, the public still has no idea 
today who manufactured and disseminated anthrax in U.S. mailings during autumn 2001.  Without 
this information, it is difficult for modelers to make projections as to the capability and opportunities 
of terrorists to undertake similar attacks or disruptive actions in the future.   
Third, the risk of future terrorist attacks depends on the terrorists’ will to attack and their 
chosen modes. Their strategies may be partially determined by the protective measures undertaken 
by those at risk and on actions taken by the government to enhance general security. Moreover, 
foreign policy decisions made by a government can deeply affect the desire of terrorist groups to 
                                                 
7 Large-scale terrorist attacks against civilians in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004, have been credited with altering the 
outcome of the Spanish election that occurred three days later, and hence raises the question as to the potential impact of 
terrorism as a global political weapon.     9 
attack a certain country or its interests abroad (Lapan and Sandler, 1988; Lee, 1988; Pillar, 2001) 
This  point  was  underscored  by  the  9/11  Commission  Report  on  terrorist  attacks  (National 
Commission, 2004). In this sense, terrorism risk depends on actions by both the private and public 
sectors  and  is  continuously  evolving.  This  makes  the  risk  of  future  terrorist  events  extremely 
difficult to estimate. 
A  fourth  challenge  arises  in  pricing  terrorism  risk  insurance  due  to  the  existence  of 
interdependencies.  In  contrast  to  other  insurance,  where  premium  reductions  are  given  to 
policyholders  who  undertake  preventive  measures  (like  making  buildings  safer  against  fire),  an 
insurer on its own may not be in a position to offer this type of economic incentive for terrorism 
coverage because of the interconnectedness between firms with respect to this risk. The vulnerability 
of one organization, critical economic sector or country depends not only on its own choice  of 
security  investments,  but  also  on  the  actions  of  other  agents.  Failures  of  a  weak  link  in  an 
interdependent system can have devastating impacts on all parts of the system.  
Interdependencies do not require proximity, so the antecedents to catastrophes can be quite 
distinct and distant from the actual disaster.  In the case of the 9/11  attacks, security  failures at 
Boston' s Logan airport led to crashes at the World Trade Center (WTC), the Pentagon, and in rural 
Pennsylvania. The same was true of the crash of PanAm103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 
1988. The disaster was caused by a bomb in a suitcase loaded at Goso Airport, Malta on Malta 
Airlines where security measures were lax. The suitcase was then transferred to a Pan Am feeder in 
Frankfort, and then onto Pan Am 103 in London set to explode only if the plane flew over 28,000 
feet, a height normally first attained on this route over the Atlantic Ocean (Lockerbie, 2001).   
Such interdependencies may lead to a situation where all or many firms decide not to invest 
in protection because they know that the failure of others to take similar actions can affect them even     10 
if they exert care themselves. In theory, a social insurance program can institute regulations and 
standards to reduce these negative externalities to achieve a socially optimal level of investment in 
protection, but it may not be so easy to implement these measures. (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003; Heal 
and Kunreuther, in press).   
Crisis  management  in  the  aftermath  of  an  attack  also  can  have  huge  impacts  and  ripple 
effects.  Actually,  the  9/11  events,  as  well  as  the  anthrax  attacks,  demonstrated  a  new  kind  of 
vulnerability: terrorists can use the capacity of a country’s critical infrastructure to have a large-scale 
impact on the nation by turning the diffusion capacity of our own networks against ourselves. Each 
element of the network -- every aircraft, every piece of mail -- can thus become a potential weapon 
endangering the entire network (Michel-Kerjan, 2003a).  Another limitation of terrorism insurance is 
that it normally does not cover losses unless the insured is the direct target of an attack (Godard et 
al., 2002).  For example, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) banned takeoffs of all civilian aircraft regardless of destination. In March 2004, the city of 
Chicago was denied insurance compensation for business interruption losses that resulted from the 
FAA’s decision. The specific clause of the insurance contract for business interruption specified 
covering  only  “direct  result  of  a  peril  not  excluded,”  thus  imposing  a  territorial  limitation  that 
excludes interdependent effects due to the response to an attack (U.S. District Court, 2004). 
 
Developing a Sustainable Terrorism Insurance Program 
 
Congress requires that the U.S. Department of the Treasury assess the effectiveness of TRIA 
no later than June 30, 2005, to determine whether it should be renewed, whether an alternative 
terrorism insurance program should be substituted for it, or whether insurance coverage should be     11 
left in the hands of the private sector. As input into this process, we now consider several alternative 
terrorism insurance programs and scenarios.  
 
A Market Approach 
In this scenario, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 would expire and a private market 
for terrorism insurance would be allowed to operate without any federal backstop or mandatory offer 
requirement. Some economists contend that the private market has the capacity to develop a market 
for  covering  terrorism  risks  and  that  government  intervention  limits  the  development  of  private 
solutions (Gron and Sykes, 2002; Jaffee and Russell, 2003).  Others argue that certain changes in 
tax, accounting and regulation would make it less costly for insurers to hold surplus capital and 
allow prices to adjust freely. Private insurers would then be more likely to cover the terrorism risk 
adequately (Smetters, 2004). To date no serious legislative efforts have been undertaken to initiate 
such changes.  
 Should the federal government withdraw its financial support, most private insurers are likely 
to  offer  terrorism  insurance  only  if  they  can  protect  themselves  against  catastrophic  losses  by 
purchasing reinsurance or through securitization of risks via innovative mechanisms like catastrophe 
bonds. A catastrophe bond transfers the risk of a large loss from the insurance/reinsurance industry 
to the financial markets. It has the following structure: under explicit conditions specified at its 
issuance the bond pays a higher than normal interest rate, but the interest and/or principal payments 
will be lost if a catastrophe occurs.  
Neither of these risk transfer mechanisms seems especially promising.  Even with TRIA in 
place, reinsurers have only cautiously returned to terrorism insurance, but most insurers have not 
purchased  reinsurance  probably  due  to  the  relatively  high  premiums  for  a  limited  amount  of 
available coverage (U.S. GAO, 2004).  Catastrophe bonds have been used since 1996 to cover the     12 
risk of large losses from some natural disasters, but a sustainable market for catastrophe bonds to 
cover losses from terrorist attacks has not emerged since 9/11. It is not clear whether the situation 
will  change  in  the  near  future,  at  least  in  the  United  States  (Kunreuther  and  Michel-Kerjan, 
forthcoming; U.S. GAO, 2003).
8  
In  fact,  to  date  there  has  been  little  movement  and  coordination  between  insurers  and 
reinsurers  toward  developing  a  private-industry  program  that  could  provide  sufficient  capacity 
without government participation (U.S. GAO, 2004). If nothing is done after TRIA expires, insurers 
will probably significantly increase the price of coverage, since free federal reinsurance will no 
longer be available. Many insurers may even decide not to offer this coverage to their clients, as they 
would no longer be required to do so by law. On the demand side, many firms are likely to conclude, 
as memories of 9/11 fade, that such insurance is too costly and not strictly necessary. The risk of 
future losses will be viewed as below their threshold level of concern. Moreover, if firms know that 
other firms have also not purchased coverage, they are likely to believe that the federal government 
will  assist  them  following  a  terrorist  attack.  For  these  reasons,  few  businesses  are  likely  to  be 
financially protected against the risks of terrorism.  
This outcome may be considered efficient until after the next terrorist attack, when providing 
adequate financial protection to victims of catastrophes will again take center stage. Under public 
pressure, it could be politically difficult for the government not to compensate the uninsured for 
damage they sustain. Due to the uncertainty of the risk and the fear of future catastrophic losses, 
                                                 
8 The first terrorism-related catastrophe bond was issued in Europe in August 2003. The world governing organization of 
association football (soccer), the FIFA, which organizes the 2006 World Cup in Germany, developed a bond to protect 
its investment should either a natural disaster or a terrorist attack occur that would result in the cancellation of the final 
World  Cup  game  without  the  possibility  of  it  being  re-scheduled  to  2007.  The  second  terrorist-related  bond  is  a 
securitization of catastrophe mortality risk undertaken in 2003 by Swiss Re, the world’s largest life reinsurer. (Woo, 
2004).      13 
many insurers would likely withdraw temporarily from the market as they did right after 9/11. Under 
such a scenario, new legislation is likely to impose legal requirements for terrorism insurance. 
This cycle is common in the aftermath of a catastrophic natural disaster. Following Hurricane 
Andrew in 1992 that inflicted $20 billion of insured losses (measured in 2002 dollars), insurers were 
prepared to cancel windstorm coverage in hurricane-prone areas of Florida. The state legislature 
passed a law the next year that individual insurers could not cancel more than 10 percent of their 
homeowners’ policies in any county in any one year and that they could not cancel more than 5 
percent  of  their  property  owners’  policies  statewide.    At  the  same  time,  the  Florida  Hurricane 
Catastrophe Fund was created to relieve pressure on insurers should there be a catastrophic loss from 
a  future  disaster  (Lecomte  and  Gahagan,  1998).    In  California,  insurers  refused  to  renew 
homeowners’ earthquake policies after the 1994 Northridge earthquake that caused $17 billion of 
insured losses (in 2002 dollars). This led to the formation in 1996 of a state-run earthquake insurance 
company, the California Earthquake Authority, with funds for its operation provided by insurers and 
reinsurers (Roth, 1998).  
 
Mutual Insurance Pools 
Under this arrangement insurers would be allowed to form an insurance pool to deal with 
specific lines of coverage. In effect, a group of companies provides reinsurance to each other. This 
solution has the advantage of spreading the risk over a large number of insurers who join these 
pools, but it is unclear  whether this alternative  would provide adequate coverage against mega-
terrorism. A group of 14 U.S. workers’ compensation insurers that accounts for roughly 40 percent 
of the market assessed the feasibility of a workers’ compensation terrorism reinsurance pool, since 
terrorism  protection  cannot  be  excluded  from  workers’  compensation  coverage  (Towers  Perrin, 
2004). The feasibility study concluded that while the pool could create some additional capacity for     14 
each of its members, it would not be enough to matter in the case of a large-scale terrorism attack. 
The report stated that extreme terrorist attacks could inflict workers’ compensation losses of $90 
billion, three times the capital backing of the private industry’s capacity for covering this line of 
business. In addition, the report concluded that it would be difficult to reach an agreement on the 
rates that should be charged based on terrorism exposure of pool participants.  
There  are  challenges  associated  with  the  creation  and  operation  of  a  pool  arrangement. 
Should it hold funds before a terrorist attack, or should it be an arrangement to supply such funds 
after an attack? Should participation in the pool be voluntary or mandatory? To what extent could 
the pool diversify risk and create additional capacity for each of its members? What rating scale 
should be charged by the pool to each of its members, and how could one reach a consensus by those 
considering joining? What would be the relationship between premiums charged by primary insurers 
to policyholders and those charged by the pool to cover each member insurer?   
There are data available to address these questions. For example, potential losses associated 
with  a  large  range  of  scenarios  of  attacks  are  better  understood  today.    Terrorism  risk  models 
developed since September 11 could be used to establish a national scale of rates charged by the 
pool based on terrorism exposure (Kunreuther, Michel-Kerjan and Porter, in press).  There are also 
lessons to be learned as to how rates charged by pools established in other countries have been 
defined. It is also worth understanding why specific programs abroad were created or modified after 
9/11 and how they work in practice (Michel-Kerjan, 2003b; Partner Re, 2004). For example, France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, along with other European countries and Australia, have all 
developed  insurance  programs  based  on  a  pool  of  insurance/reinsurance  with  a  back-up  by  the 
government. Each government, in collaboration with representatives of the insurance industry, sets 
up national scale of reinsurance rates charged by the pool that depend on location of the risk  (Pool     15 
Re in the United Kingdom) or on total insured value wherever the risk is located (Gareat in France, 
Extremus in the Germany) (Michel-Kerjan and Pedell, forthcoming).   
If a pool arrangement is to emerge in the United States as part of an overall package for 
providing terrorism insurance, it seems likely that national associations of insurers and reinsurers, in 
partnership with the U.S. Treasury, could play a key role in its implementation and in undertaking 
systematic analyses as to how well the system is actually working.   
 
Layers of Insurance 
 
  The challenge in providing terrorism insurance is to spread the risks appropriately between 
the insured parties, the insurance industry, broader capital markets, and the government. Here we 
sketch a proposal to provide terrorism coverage through a multi-layer system.  
Those purchasing terrorism insurance would be  responsible for the initial level of losses 
through a deductible on the policy. It might be possible to have an arrangement in which the size of 
the deductible and the premium were based to some extent on the nature of loss reduction measures 
and response preparedness in which the insured would have invested.  
For losses above the deductible, insurers and reinsurers would cover a second tier of losses 
up to a specific threshold for total losses. One option could be the creation of a pool arrangement 
similar  to  current  programs  in  European  countries.  Since  a  pool  arrangement  brings  insurers 
together,  it  might  encourage  them  to  link  coverage  with  risk  mitigation/response  preparedness 
measures so as to deal explicitly with the negative externalities caused by the interdependencies 
associated with terrorism risk discussed above. For example, all insurers in the pool may want to 
require  specific  risk  reduction  measures  as  a  condition  for  coverage.  They  may  also  want  to 
negotiate a specific arrangement with the public sector for reimbursement of business interruption     16 
losses resulting from federal responses to an attack, such as shutting down the airlines, the postal 
system or other critical infrastructure.  
There could be a pre-existing arrangement for the pool to obtain federal loans at low rates, 
should the reserves of the pool be insufficient during its first years of operation to cover insurance 
losses from a major attack.  If the pool’s financial commitment is well-defined  and limited to a 
specified amount of coverage, a consortium of international insurers and reinsurers could cover a 
specific  range  of  losses  above  the  pool’s  liability,  as  has  been  done  by  Swiss  Re in  France  or 
Berkshire Hathaway in Germany (Michel-Kerjan and Pedell, forthcoming). If reinsurers are willing 
to provide substantial amounts of coverage, then investors might want to provide capital for issuing 
terrorism catastrophe bonds. 
 State and federal reinsurance could cover losses for extreme events that exceeded the layers 
of  private  coverage.    The  public  sector  has  the  capacity  to  diversify  the  risks  over  the  entire 
population  and  to  spread  past  losses  to  future  generations  of  taxpayers,  a  form  of  cross-time 
diversification  that  the  private  market  cannot  achieve  because  of  the  incompleteness  of 
intergenerational private markets and legal limitations for insurers to accumulate financial reserves 
(Gollier, 2002; Smetters, 2004).  Such government reinsurance protection could be provided with its 
charging  insurance  companies  a  premium  based  on  how  much  coverage  they  would  require  to 
protect  themselves  against  catastrophic  losses  from  a  terrorist  attack.  By  tying  the  reinsurance 
premium to the amount of coverage, the government could provide an additional economic incentive 
for insurers to require all their policyholders to invest in specific protective measures.  
 
Required Insurance 
If terrorism insurance is voluntary, it seems likely that the combination of reluctant insurers 
and  reluctant  buyers  will  result  in  limited  coverage.  Banks  could  require  terrorism  insurance     17 
coverage as a condition for loans and mortgages to protect their own financial interests, as they do 
for fire coverage today. A broad move in this direction currently does not exist, although as pointed 
out above, pressure for TRIA was stimulated by a delay in projects due to the requirements by 
financial institutions to be covered against losses due to terrorism. (U.S. GAO, 2003). An alternative 
would be for government to require all firms to purchase terrorism insurance.  
Mandatory coverage for terrorism risks would address many difficult problems. Since all 
firms would be financially protected, it would reduce the demand for government aid that is sure to 
arise after an attack by those who failed to purchase insurance. The recovery process would be 
facilitated through insurance claims dispersed rapidly to those suffering losses. By expanding the 
market  for  terrorism  coverage,  the  insurance  industry  could  diversify  its  risks  across  structures, 
industries and geographical areas, and stabilize premium incomes.  
To date, the question as to whether coverage should be required has not been explicitly part 
of the debate regarding the future of terrorism insurance in the United States. It was discussed 50 
years ago as part of a dialog on the creation of war damage insurance program in the aftermath of 
World War II (Hirshleifer, 1953). That question may be given serious consideration if other terrorist 
attacks, even small-sized ones, occur on U.S. soil.  Indeed, the more an industrialized country has 
suffered from terrorism, the more likely such coverage has been made mandatory, as in France and 
Spain. Obviously, it is much easier to defend a voluntary private market approach for providing 
terrorism insurance when no losses have been incurred.  
 
Conclusion 
Insurance is a way of spreading risk and a way of encouraging investments in protective 
measures  to  reduce  the  likelihood  and  potential  losses  from  a  future  untoward  event.  It  also     18 
contributes to the social and economic continuity of the country should a large-scale terrorist attack 
occur. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the insured costs associated with the terrorist attacks 
were spread across the U.S. and European economies. There were debates here and abroad on the 
role  and  responsibilities  of  the  federal  government  and  the  private  sector  in  providing  adequate 
protection against terrorism.  In the  United States, this led to the passage of the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA).  
Broadly understood, how we approach the issue of terrorism risk insurance is an important 
tile  within  the  mosaic  of  our  national  security.    Today  the  development  of  a  public-private 
partnership could facilitate the creation of a large and sustainable insurance market for terrorism 
risk. The U.S. government could partner more systematically with the private sector, not only in 
providing some degree of government reinsurance, but also in facilitating private sector insurance 
arrangements. Such an involvement of the public sector would also facilitate the linkage of terrorism 
insurance with private expenditures to better prepare the nation by reducing interdependent risks of 
terrorism and hence the direct and indirect consequences of an attack.   
We  believe,  however,  that  there  are  better  ways  to  deal  with  these  financial  issues  than 
through TRIA. If a two year extension of TRIA is approved, Congress could explicitly request a 
study  involving  the  affected  stakeholders  for  developing  such  a  sustainable  terrorism  insurance 
program in the United States. We also are concerned that if nothing coherent is done should TRIA 
expire, another terrorist mega-attack could have a much greater financial and social impacts than 




     19 
Doherty,  Neil,  Lamm-Tennant,  Joan,  and  Starks,  Laura.  2003.  “Insuring  September  11th: 
Market Recovery and Transparency”. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 26:2/3, pp. 179-199. 
Godard,  Olivier,  Henry,  Claude,  Lagadec,  Patrick  and  Erwann  Michel-Kerjan.  2002.  
Treatise on New Risks. Precaution, Crisis Management, Insurance. Paris: Editions Gallimard, Folio-
Actuel, p.620. 
Gollier,  Christian.  2002.  “Insurability”.  Paper  presented  at  the  NBER  Insurance  Group 
Workshop. Cambridge. MA, February 1. 
Gron,  Anne  and  Sykes,  Alan.  2002.  “Terrorism  and  Insurance  Markets:  A  Role  for  the 
Government as Insurer?” Regulation. Winter 2002-2003, pp.44-51. 
Hale, David. (2002). “America Uncovered.” Financial Times. September 12. 
Hartwig, Robert. 2004. “The Fate of TRIA: Is Terrorism an Insurance Risk?” Insurance Information 
Institute, New York, NY. 
Hartwig, Robert. 2002.  “September 11, 2001:  The First Year. One Hundred Minutes of Terror 
that Changed the Global Insurance Industry Forever.” Insurance Information Institute, New York, 
NY. 
Heal, Geoffrey and Kunreuther, Howard.  (in press). “IDS Models of Airline Security”  Journal 
of Conflict Resolution.    
Hirshleifer, Jack. 1953. “ War Damage Insurance.” Review of Economics and Statistics. 35: 2, 
pp.144-153. 
Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Hubbard,  Glenn  and  Deal,  Bruce.  2004.  “The  Economic  Effects  of  Federal  Participation  in 
Terrorism Risk.” Analysis Group. September 14. 
Jaffee, Dwight and Russell, Thomas. 2003. “Market Under Stress: The Case of Extreme Event 
Insurance” in Richard Arnott, Bruce Greenwald, Ravi Kanbur and Barry Nalebuff (eds), Economics 
for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor of Joseph E. Stiglitz. MIT Press. 
Kunreuther,  Howard  and  Michel-Kerjan,  Erwann.  (forthcoming).  Insurability  of  (Mega)-
Terrorism. Challenges and Perspectives. Report for the OECD Task Force on Terrorism Insurance; 
revised version, September 2004. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
Kunreuther,  Howard,  Michel-Kerjan,  Erwann  and  Porter,  Beverly.  (in  press).  “Extending 
Catastrophe Modeling to Terrorism” in Patricia Grossi and Howard Kunreuther (eds.), with Chandu 
Patel. Catastrophe Modeling: A New Approach to Managing Risk. Kluwer Academic Publisher, 
Boston. 
Kunreuther, Howard and Heal, Geoffrey. 2003. “Interdependent Security.” Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty. 26:2/3, pp. 231-249. 
Lapan, Harvey and Sandler, Tood. 1988. “To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is The Question”. 
American Economic Review. 78:2, 16-20. 
Lecomte, Eugene and Gahagan, Karen. 1998. “Hurricane Insurance Protection in Florida” in 
Kunreuther  Howard  and  Roth,  Richard,  Sr.    (eds.),  Paying  the  Price:  The  Status  and  Role  of 
Insurance Against Natural Disasters in the United States.   Washington, D.C: Joseph Henry Press. 
Lee, Dwight. 1988. “Free Riding and Paid Riding in the Fight Against Terrorism”. American 
Economic Review. 78:2, pp. 22-26. 
    Lockerbie, Verdict. 2001. Her Majesty’s Advocate, v. Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al 
Amin Khalifa Fhimah, Case No.: 1475/99. High Court of Justiciary at Camp Zeist: January 31.  
MacDonald,  James.  2004.  “Terrorism,  Insurance,  and  TRIA:  Are  We  Asking  the  Right 
Questions?” The John Liner Review.18:2, pp.87-96.     20 
Marsh Inc. 2004.”Marketwatch: Property Terrorism Insurance. Update-2
nd Quarter 2004”, August 
2004. 
Michel-Kerjan, Erwann and Pedell, Burkhard. (forthcoming) “Terrorism Risk Coverage in the 
Post-9/11 Era: A Comparison of New Public-Private Partnerships in France, Germany and the U.S.”  
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance. 
Michel-Kerjan,  Erwann.  2003-b.  “Large-scale  Terrorism:  Risk  Sharing  and  Public  Policy.” 
Revue d’Economie Politique. 113:5, pp. 625-648. 
Michel-Kerjan,  Erwann.  2003-a.  “New  Vulnerabilities  in  Critical  Infrastructures:  A  U.S. 
Perspective.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. 11:3, pp.132-141. 
Morgan  Stanley.  2004.  “Assessing  Insurer’s  Terrorism  Risk”.  Equity  Research,  Insurance  – 
Property and Casualty, March. 
National  Commission  on  Terrorist  Attacks  Upon  The  United  States.  2004.  The  9/11 
Commission Report. Washington, DC., July. 
Partner Re. 2004. “Terrorism Insurance. Pools & Market Solutions in Europe”, May. 
Pillar, Paul. 2001. Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, p272. 
Roth, Richard, Jr.  1998.  “Earthquake Insurance Protection in California” in Kunreuther Howard 
and Roth, Richard, Sr.  (eds.), Paying the Price: The Status and Role of Insurance Against Natural 
Disasters in the United States.   Washington, D.C: Joseph Henry Press.  
Sandler,  Todd  and  Enders,  Walter.  2004.  “An  Economic  Perspective  of  Transnational 
Terrorism”, European Journal of Political Economy. 20:2, pp.301-316 
Smetters, Kent. 2004. “Insuring Against Terrorism: The Policy Challenge”. Brookings-Wharton 
Papers on Financial Services, Robert E. Litan and Richard Herring (eds.), pp. 139 - 182. 
Stern, Jessica. 2003. Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill. New York: Harper 
Collins. 
Towers  Perrin.  2004.  “Workers’  Compensation  Terrorism  Reinsurance  Pool  Feasibility  Study”. 
March. 
U.S. Congress. 2002. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. HR 3210. Washington, DC., November 
26. 
U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Economic  Committee.  2002.  Economic  Perspectives  on  Terrorism 
Insurance. Washington, DC: May 2002. 
U.S.  District  Court  for  the  Northern  District  of  Illinois,  Eastern  Division.  2004.  City  of 
Chicago v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company. 02C7023. March 11. 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 2004.  Terrorism Insurance. Effects of the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act of 2002. Testimony of Richard Hillman. GAO-04-720T. Washington, D.C.: April 
28. 
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 2003.  Catastrophe Insurance Risks. Status of Efforts to 
Securitize Natural Catastrophe and Terrorism Risk. GAO-03-1033. Washington, D.C.: September. 
 U.S.  General  Accounting  Office  (GAO).  2002.    “Terrorism  Insurance:  Rising  Uninsured 
Exposure  to  Attacks  Heightens  Potential  Economic  Vulnerabilities.”  Testimony  of  Richard  J. 
Hillman  before  the  Subcommittee  on  Oversight  and  Investigations,  Committee  on  Financial 
Services, House of Representatives.  February 27. 
White House. 2002. National Strategy for Homeland Security.  Washington, DC, July 2002. 
Woo, Gordon. 2004. “A Catastrophe Bond Niche: Multiple Event Risk”, Paper presented at the 
NBER Insurance Group Workshop, Cambridge, MA, February 7.     21 
 
 